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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The right to strike in South Africa is safeguarded by the Constitution1 and labour laws. Strikes, 
whether violent or peaceful are costly to the employers involved. 2 The harm which is caused 
by these strikes is not only to the employer, but also the workers suffer loss of income and great 
hardships during these strikes.3 The loss is not only suffered by the employer, but customers 
and suppliers too. The economy of the country is adversely affected. This deters investments 
in big companies, where its employees are on violent strikes. South Africa has one of the most 
inflated rates of violent strikes in the world.4 The Labour Relations Act5 (hereinafter referred 
to as the LRA) does not precisely address violent strikes. It has been suggested that protected 
strikes could forfeit their protection if it occurs that they descend into violence which has a 
potential to cause mass damage to the employer.6 It cannot but be disputed that violent strikes 
amount to the abuse of the constitutional protected right to strike and the courts have 
acknowledged it as being a scourge. Courts should be empowered to put an end to these violent 
strikes. 
In South Africa, strike and protest actions are not new phenomena.7 During the 1970s, there 
was a large number of strikes. The most notable examples are the 1973 strikes which took place 
in Durban, when ‘Black workers’ embarked on a wave of strikes over wage dispute. Both the 
Government and the employers were shocked but responded by giving in to the workers’ 
demands.8 The Soweto uprising in 1976, although not related to labour issues, is one of the 
most significant examples of violent protests against apartheid in history which started 
peacefully but ended violently.  
                                                             
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
2 B Hepple ‘The Freedom to Strike and its Rationale’ in: Hepple B, Le Roux R, Sciarra S (editors). Laws against 
strikes. The South African Experience in an international and comparative perspective (2015) 27. 
3 Ibid. 
4 N Odendaal ‘SA one of the world’s most violent, strike-prone countries’ (2014), available at 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/sa-one-of-the-worlds-most-violent-strike-prone-countries-2014-08-06, 
accessed on 01 April 2018. 
5 Act 66 of 1995. 
6 N Coetzer ‘A new remedy for violent strikes?’ available at  https://www.labourguide.co.za/most-recent/2242-
a-new-remedy-for-violent-strikes, accessed on 04 April 2018.  
7 T Petrus and W Martin ‘Reflection on violence and scapegoating in the strike and protest culture in South 
Africa’ (2011) 41 (2) African Insight 49. 
8 South African History Online ‘History of Labour Movement in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/article/history-labour-movements-south-africa, accessed on 29 March 2018. 
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In the post-democracy, violent strikes in South Africa continues. Between 2007 and 2011, 
South Africa had encountered about of 65 strikes per year. 9 In 2012, “the country had a loss 
of 17 million working hours, 16 million of these in the mining sector,10 as a result of 99 strikes, 
45 of which were unprotected”. 11  In addition, the number of work stoppages is rapidly 
increasing. It has been established that for every 1 000 working South Africans, from year 2006 
to 2011, about 507 working days were lost a year as a result of strikes,12 bearing in mind that 
this does not include the 2012 period to present strikes, an unimaginable amount of working 
days has been lost due to strikes, which in turn have an adverse effect on the economy. South 
Africa has been established as having the highest rate of strikes in the world. However, the 
Chamber of Mines president ‘disagreed with the assertion that South Africa has excessive 
number of strike occurrences in the world, he did however acknowledge that the nation was 
confronted with intensifying number of strikes and admitted that the increasing number of 
unprotected strikes were disturbing.’13 
Despite the harm strikes cause or have the potential to cause, all democratic countries such as 
South Africa, regard the ‘right to strike’ as essential, along with the freedom of association, 
freedom to join and organise trade unions, freedom of assembly and freedom of speech.14 
Moreover, an employee’s right to strike is one of the weapons exercised by trade unions when 
collective bargaining become unsuccessful.15  Strike action is used as a last resort by the 
employees and their organisations in making sure that their grievances are met. Without the 
protection of the right to strike, employees would not be able to easily exercise their right to 
freedom of association.16 
Before the LRA was amended there were much doubts as to whether a trade union could be 
held liable for damages suffered during strike action.17 Under the common law principles, an 
                                                             
9 Odendaal (note 4 above). 
10 In 2012, at Marikana, where a large number of striking worker were killed, and hundreds injured during a 
wage related strike at Lonmin, a misconception that the workers received a 22% hike in wages had spurred 
strike action across the mining sector, particularly the gold and coal sectors. 
11 Coetzer (note 6 above). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Hepple (note 2 above) 27. 
15 E Manamela and M Budeli ‘Employees’ right to strike and violence in South Africa’ (2013) 46 (3) CILSA 
308.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Z Zakasa ‘Comments regarding the Labour Relations Amendment Bill’ (2018), available at 
https://www.wits.co.za/media/wits-university/faculties-and-schools/commerce-law-and-management/research-
entities/cals/documents/programmes/rule-of-
law/resources/CALS%20Comments%20on%LRA%Amendment%20Bill.pdf, accessed on 09 September 2018. 
The amendment to the LRA addresses the increasing levels of unprotected strikes (as well as violent strikes) by 
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employer who experiences a loss due to  a strike may have delictual claim against the union 
and the employees who were involved in such a strike.18 Nevertheless, it has been held that 
there are complications in holding the union responsible mainly for actions perpetrated by its 
members.19  
1.2 Statement of purpose  
The main objective of the right to strike is to strive to replace the imbalance which have been 
created by socioeconomic factors.20 Without the protection of the right to strike, trade unions 
become pathetic, powerless bodies and the rule of management become absolute.21 Strikes, 
especially violent strikes, tend to be the final stage where the employer does not agree to the 
employees’ grievances, and the employer, in order to save his company, tries to meet his 
employees half way. Moreover, most of the strikes in South Africa are commenced by trade 
unions during the collective bargaining process, when trade unions and employers fail to reach 
agreement on matters which are of mutual interest.22 The LRA provides protection to the 
employees on strike and their trade unions. However, should unlawful conduct arise during the 
strike, either protected or unprotected, the trade union will be liable for such damages caused. 
This study will consider the extent of violent strikes, how they can be addressed and trade 
unions liability for loss caused during violent strikes. It will critically evaluate the ways in 
which South Africa can address the violent strikes and minimise loss to the stakeholders, such 
as applying to the Labour Court for an interdict, claims for compensation and dismissal of the 
employees. 
1.3 Rationale 
Employees tend to engage in strike action to effect economic damage on their employers, so 
that the employers will give way to their grievances.23 The employees may abuse this power 
as it may even escalates to third parties who are not involved in the strike. The courts are often 
                                                             
further determining the circumstances under which employees may strike. Since the right to strike is an 
important tool for trade unions, a duty is placed upon them to make sure that the strike follows the prescribed 
procedures by the amendment. Failure will result to the trade union being held liable for the misconduct 
committed during a strike. The amendment introduced a requirement that the vote by the members of trade 
unions on whether to embark on strike action be by secret ballot. This will reduce a number of violent strikes 
that the employers face.   
18 P. A. K Le Roux ‘Claims for compensation arising from strikes and lockouts’ (2013) 23 (2) CLL 11. 
19 Mondi Ltd (Mondi Kraft Division) v Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union and 
others (2005) 26 ILJ 1458 (LC). 
20 Hepple (note 2 above) 18. 
21 Manamela (note 15 above) 309. 
22 Ibid, 310. 
23 A Basson… et al. Essential Labour Law 5th Ed (2009) 303. 
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unwilling to interrupt the process of industrial action so as not to interfere with the right to 
strike.24 Nevertheless, it has been held that the courts could intercede when the union failed to 
show that it had any lawful interest of its member in mind.25  
The main purpose of this study is to focus on means by which we can address violent strikes. 
Furthermore, this study will evaluate the relevant provisions in the LRA and how they protect 
employees and employers. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the questions that arise in the analysis of violent strikes and whether 
trade unions are liable for damages caused such strikes, and how these strikes can be addressed 
by labour laws. The questions to be answered are the following:  
a) How does the LRA protect employees engaged in strikes? 
b) What are the prerequisites of a protected strike? 
c) What are the remedies that are available to stakeholders? 
d) Can trade unions be held liable for damages that arise from a protected strike that turns 
violent? 
e) What are the claims that can arise for the employer or innocent 3rd parties, particularly 
delictual claims and compensation? 
f) When trade union members refuse the representation of a trade union, can a trade union 
be held liable for damages caused by violent strikes? 
1.5 Research Methodology 
This research will be conducted through the desktop research method with reference to the 
labour law legislations, particularly the Labour Relations Act, case-law and most importantly 
the Constitution. The research will be done by using both primary and secondary sources which 
will give an overview of the legal framework as regarding to strikes, protected and unprotected. 
This study will contain a literature review on the chosen topic with relevant case law as to how 
the courts have tried to resolve the issue of violent strikes which is faced by South Africa. 
 
                                                             
24 SB Gericke ‘Revisiting the liability of trade unions and or their members during strikes: Lessons to be learnt 
from case law’ (2012) 75 THRHR 566. 
25 Jumbo Products v NUMSA 1996 ILJ 859 (W) 878.  
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1.6 Literature Review  
The right to strike is a significant constituent of collective bargaining as per the International 
Labour Organisation, Convention 98.26  Industrial action is a weapon which is utilised by 
employees to make sure there is equality in the workplace. Therefore, by collective bargaining 
the employees enforce economic pressure against an employer to persuade them to give way 
to their demands. The LRA, in section 5, safeguards employees against harm and victimization 
for utilising rights conferred by it. Manamela points out that, whether protected or not, a strike 
will incur certain consequences. 27  Employees should not make themselves guilty of 
misconduct during their strike action, even though they have complied with the required 
requirements in the LRA. 28 
Vettori asserts that the right to strike in the LRA is made accessible to a trade union when the 
employer does not want to bargain collectively with the union or declines to acknowledge the 
union, provided that the procedural requirements of a strike action were complied with, and the 
strike is in compliance with section 67 of the Act.29 The Labour Appeal Court has stated that 
‘by withholding their labour, the employees are in hope to discontinue to the production, 
precipitating the employer to lose business and experience overhead expenses without the 
anticipation of income, in the expectation that should losses be sufficiently substantial, the 
employer will recognise to their grievances.’30 A trade union possesses the right to dictate its 
own constitutional rules, and to plan and organise its administration and lawful activities, 
including strike action.31 Trade unions and employer or their organisations are given a right to 
engage in collective bargaining.  
Furthermore, an employer may not dismiss an employee who is lawfully exercising his right to 
engage in a strike or any lawful conduct in furtherance of a protected strike.32 Nevertheless, 
the courts have had difficulty in deciding what should be done when unlawful conduct is 
involved during strike action such as a protected strike which becomes violent. Tom in her 
thesis says, “damage caused as a result of violent strikes does not only affect employers, but 
                                                             
26 A Van Niekerk… et al Law@work 3 ed (2015) 415.  
27 Manamela (note 15 above) 322. 
28 Ibid. 
29 S Vettori ‘The Labour Relations Act and the Protection of Trade Unions’ (2005) 17 SA Merc LJ 304.   
30 VNR Steel (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA 1995 ILJ 1483 (LAC). 
31 Section 23 (note 1 above). 
32 Section 67 (note 5 above). 
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members of trade unions and innocent third parties are also affected.”33 In the case of FAWU v 
Premier Foods Ltd t/a Ribbon Salt River,34 the court held that, ‘it is certainly not acceptable to 
force an employer through violent and criminal conduct to accede to their demands. This type 
of vigilante conduct not only seriously undermines the fundamental values of the Constitution, 
but also serves to seriously and irreparably undermine future relations between strikers and 
their employer.’ The court was of the view that the strikers conduct resulted in those employees 
who did not want to strike, being affected because they no longer felt safe within the workplace 
premises as the employees who were on strike threatened them if they continued working. 
When employees exercise their right to strike should not seek to affect those who do not want 
to part and parcel in that strike. 
There are lot of consequences that are associated with strikes, particularly where a strike 
involves violent conduct. According to the common law principles, “an employer may have 
delictual claim against a trade union or an employee who is involved in an unlawful conduct 
for damages caused during a strike action.”35 Trade unions should control strikes which are 
convened by their members for it to be within the bounds of law. 
 Le Roux points out that a strike will thus be unprotected as soon as violent acts are present. In 
the Tsogo Sun Casinos (Pty) Ltd t/a Monte casino v Future of South African Worker’s Union 
and Others36 it was held that a court will always intervene to protect both the right to strike, 
and the right to peaceful picketing. This is an inherent part of the court’s mandate, conferred 
by the Constitution and the LRA. The exercise of the right to strike is ‘however sullied and 
ultimately eclipsed when those who purport to exercise it engage in acts of gratuitous violence 
in order to achieve their ends.’37  
Moreover, in the National Union of Food Beverages Wine Spirit and Allied Workers and 
Others v Universal Product Network (Pty) Ltd,38 the court pointed out that in relation to the 
                                                             
33 P. Y Tom ‘A trade union’s liability for damages caused during a strike: a critical evaluation of the Labour 
Relations Act and recent judgements’ (LLM Theses, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2014) available at 
https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/12361, accessed on 26 May 2018.  
34 FAWU obo Kapesi and Others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Ribbon Salt River (2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC). 
35 Le Roux (note 18 above) 11. 
36 (2012) 33 ILJ 998 (LC); in this case the strike had gone beyond control, resulting in violence and damage to 
property. The Labour Court granted an interdict in favour of the employer and the order of costs was granted 
against the employees involved in a strike and their trade union. 
37 Ibid, at para 13. 
38 (2016) 37 ILJ 476 (LC) at 37; in that matter, the Court was faced with a situation where banners had been 
displayed which criticised the employer’s holding company for doing business with Israel, Palestinian flags 
were waved and official and members of the Economic Freedom Fighters become involved in the strike in 
various ways. In addition, the Union’s members engaged in several acts of violence.  
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acts of violence in respect of which the applicant seeks to have the strike declared unprotected, 
it was regrettable that acts of wanton and gratuitous violence appear inevitably to accompany 
strike action, whether protected or unprotected. It was further held that strike related 
misconduct is a scourge and a serious impediment to the peaceful exercise of the right to strike 
and picket.39 Therefore, those who are not involved in a strike become victims of the violence 
committed by those in strike who believe that they are ‘sell-outs’ (those not in a strike). There 
is high risk posed on investors and this ultimately has a negative impact on the economy.  
Rycroft has pointed out that there is no provision in the LRA that clearly provides that a strike 
will lose its protection if misconduct takes place, nevertheless, this is implied in the powers of 
the Labour Court.40 Employers tend to use this to justify dismissing striking employees.  
When employees picket, they should refrain from exceeding the bounds of peaceful persuasion 
to support a strike, should they exceed the bounds, the picket then ceases to be reasonable and 
lawful.41 Therefore, where the employer suffered harm as a result of a strike, there can be a 
delictual claim. Also, should there be loss, a claim for compensation in section 68 of the LRA 
is available if the strike turns violent. However, the claim for compensation is not only available 
when the strike turns violent, it can also be available when the striking employees do not 
comply with the laws and procedures made available to them by the employer.  
Rather than condemning the violence which takes place during strike, the Labour Court in 
National Union of Food Beverages Wine Spirit and Allied Workers42 reached a conclusion 
which seems to imply that a strike’s protected status is only capable of being impugned if and 
when the level of violence passes a certain threshold. That which needs to be examined is what 
this threshold is since it not yet clear. Coetzer is of the view that the labour court will be slow 
to intervene in circumstances where the strike remains functional to collective bargaining, even 
in the presence of violence. 43  A strike will be judged as functional where it does not 
delegitimise the process of collective bargaining.  
 
 
                                                             
39 Ibid. 
40 A Rycroft 'What Can Be Done about Strike-Related Violence?' (2014) 30 (2) IJCLLIR 199.   
41 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 2681 (LC) at para 30. 
42 Universal Product Network supra note 38.  
43 Coetzer (note 6 above).   
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CHAPTER 2: LAWS CONTROLLING STRIKES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction  
Strikes in nature have a negative impact on the economy of our country. However, strikes are 
considered as a fundamental right by international laws and in terms of South African law.44 
Employees often resort to strike action as they believe it is the legitimate weapon against their 
employer to persuade the employer to accede to their demands, and this has been accepted by 
the courts.45 Whilst the right to strike is acknowledged as a foundational right in South Africa, 
this right can only be utilised if it is in compliance with certain promulgated requirements as 
set out in the LRA.46 It is clear that should the strike not comply with the requirements in the 
LRA, it will not be protected and that will give an employer a right to institute a disciplinary 
action against those engaged in a strike and to sue strikers or their trade union for the loss 
suffered.47 Therefore, although the right to strike is statutory protected, it is limited in certain 
instances. This chapter will provide how this right is limited. 
2.2 The statutory definition of a strike   
A strike is defined in the LRA as follows: 
 The partial or complete concerted refusal to work, or the retardation or obstruction of 
work, by persons who are or have been employed by the same employer or by different 
employers, for the purposes or remedying a grievance or resolving a dispute in respect 
of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the employee, and reference 
to work in this definition includes overtime work, whether it is voluntary or 
compulsory.48  
In breaking down the definition, it is clear that there are elements which needs to be present in 
order for a strike to exist, which are as follows: (a) there must be refusal to work by workers; 
(b) there must be collective actions of workers with the same purpose; (c) the rationale behind 
the refusal to work by workers must be to remedy a grievance or resolve a dispute; (d) the case 
in point must be of a ‘mutual interest’ between an employer and employee. 
                                                             
44 Hepple (note 2 above) 27. 
45 SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck. Principles of Labour Law. 2 ed. (2002) 379; see also NUM v East Rand 
Gold and Uranium Co Ltd 1991 ILJ 1222 (A); NUMSA v Boart MSA (Pty) Ltd [1996] 1 BLLR 13 (LAC). 
46 J Grogan Workplace law. 12 ed. (2017) 405. 
47 Ibid, 438. 
48 Section 213 (note 5 above). 
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2.2.1 Refusal to work 
Strikes have been said to be easily recognisable especially when it turns violent. Hence, ‘when 
employees lay down their tools during their working hours and refuse to continue working 
when they should be doing so, their action normally comprises a strike.’49 As the definition 
states, the refusal to work can be partial or complete and can also include retardation or 
obstruction of work.50 Strike action does not need to amount to a complete disengagement of 
labour. A partial refusal could be understood to mean that employees are willing to perform 
part of their duties, but not all of them. The retardation of work is manifested by what is referred 
to as a ‘go-slow’, where employees continue to work, but not at their usual pace (they work at 
slower pace).51 Furthermore, obstruction of work refers to where employees in one way or 
another hamper production or the work process.52 What also emerges from the definition is that 
refusal by employees to work overtime in support of their grievances is viewed as a strike, 
whether the overtime is voluntary or not. 
In Gobile’s case,53 employees refused to work overtime on public holidays and stated that they 
were not contractually compelled to work over time. There were three of these employees and 
their denial to work was not guided by any communicated request. The court examined the 
objective of their action in order to decide whether their refusal to work composed a strike.54 
The court held that the employees purpose was to make their employer accept their impression 
of what their contractual burdens should be. Therefore, actions comprised of a strike in that 
their refusal to work emanated from the fact that they did not want to work overtime if it was 
not agreed from the first instance that they will have to work overtime.   
2.2.2 Collective action  
A single employee cannot strike as the definition of a strike requires that the failure or refusal 
to work must be by collective employees. Therefore, more than two employees can engage in 
a strike provided that they must have the same objective. ‘In the unlikely event of a number of 
employees independently and simultaneously resolving to put down the tools in response to 
the same grievance, their action will not comprise a strike if their refusal to work is not 
                                                             
49 Grogan (note 46 above) 406. 
50 Ibid. 
51 S Bendix. Labour Relations: A Southern African Perspective. 6 ed. (2015) 527.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Gobile v BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd and others (1999) 20 ILJ 2027 (LAC). 
54 T Cohen, A Rycroft and B Whitcher Trade Unions and the Law in South Africa (2009) 48. 
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collective in both nature and intent.’55 The right to strike extends even to employees who fall 
outside the bargaining unit or belong to a different trade union.56  
In Afrox Ltd,57  employees engaged on a strike to place compulsion on their employer to 
abandon a staggered shift system. The employer abandoned the shift system and started a 
retrenchment process. The LC held that when the cause of complaint is withdrawn, the existing 
strike is flawed and no longer has an objective.58 The court further held that the employees 
could not proceed striking in reaction to the retrenchments.  This was because the 
retrenchments did not give rise to the disagreement, rather it was a shift system that did, which 
the employer had abandoned.59  
2.2.3 Following a grievance or dispute 
Unlike the current definition of ‘strike’ in the LRA, “the definition of ‘strike’ in the 1956 LRA 
made it clear that a strike had to be aimed at inducing an employer to comply with some 
demands.” 60  Hence, strike actions usually ensue from unsuccessful negotiations between 
employees and their employer. Employees cannot simply refuse to work if they do not have 
any grievances against their employer or are not seeking to remedy a grievance or resolve a 
dispute that will not amount to a strike in terms of the statutory definition.61 Moreover, if a 
demand is unlawful, the union which represents employees should not support that strike. The 
strike will cease when the employer has acceded to the employees’ grievances. Hence, if the 
employees continue striking after that point, it will be unlawful and unprotected.  
2.2.4 The dispute must concern a matter of mutual interest 
From the definition, it is clear that the ‘refusal to work’ to comprise a strike, it must be ‘for the 
purposes of remedying a grievance or determining a dispute in respect of any matter of mutual 
interest between the employer and employee’.62 The phrase “matters of mutual interest” is not 
defined in the LRA. Nevertheless, it appeared in section 24(1) of the 1956 LRA (previously 
known as the Industrial Conciliation Act), which provided that industrial-council agreements 
                                                             
55 Grogan (note 46 above) 407. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Afrox Ltd v SACWU and others (1) (1997) 18 ILJ 399 (LC). 
58 M. D Mbona ‘A critical analysis of the law on strikes in South Africa’ (LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
2014) available at https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/13401, accessed on 17 July 2018.   
59 Ibid; Afrox supra note 57 at para 388. 
60 Grogan (note 46 above) 408. 
61 Bendix (note 51 above), 527. 
62 Grogan (note 46 above) 408.  
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could include “any matters whatsoever of mutual interest to employers and employees”.63 In 
Vanachem Vanadium Products (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa,64 
the court found that “matters of mutual interest” means no more than what is of mutual 
advantage or benefit to employers and employees and therefore of the industry as a whole.  
In Mzeku and others v Volkswagen SA (Pty) Ltd and others,65 the union suspended its shop 
stewards who had ignored an agreement formed by the union and the employer. As a result, 
the employees decided not to work and insisted that the stop stewards be returned to work. The 
LC reasoned that the stoppage of work by employees did not constitute a strike, and the Labour 
Appeal Court welcomed this reasoning. The reason for this was that it aimed at settling an 
internal disagreement between the employees and the union and at compelling the union to 
accept a demand. Therefore, the LAC considered the stoppage of work as an unprotected strike 
because the employer could not comply with the demand.66   
2.3 Primary and secondary strikes 
When carefully reading the statutory definition of a strike, a strike can be primary or secondary. 
A primary strike is where employees put compulsion on their employer for their grievances to 
be met and they have direct interest on the outcome of the matter.67 Primary strikes can happen 
in the following ways: a full work stoppage, a repetition/intermittent strike or a partial strike. 
A full work stoppage is a complete refusal to work by employees.68 A repetition/intermittent 
strike is a recurring strike, which is undertaken by the same employees in respect of the same 
issues and at the same time.69 
Furthermore, a partial strike is a strike which is the opposite of a total stoppage of work. A 
partial strike is a collective term of the following: go-slows, work-to-rule, overtime ban and 
grasshopper.70  Employees engaged in a ‘go-slow strike’, do not work according to their usual 
pace, they work slowly. The impact of such a strike is that an employer will see a decline in 
production and income to the company. It has been said that it is not easy for the management 
of a company to take proper action against the employees who are on a go-slow strike because 
                                                             
63 M.E. Manamela ‘Matters of mutual interest for purposes of a strike’ (2015) 36 (3) Obiter 793. 
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it is strenuous for the employer to show that the employees are on that strike.71 In a ‘work-to-
rule strike’ the employees objective is similar to that of a go-slow strike, which is a decrease 
in production and income, but the techniques used for the attainment of such an aim are not the 
same. The employees try to make certain that the employer loses profit without breaching the 
contract.72 With regards to an overtime ban, employees can refuse to work overtime even if 
they were contractually bound to do so, such refusal constitutes a strike.73 However, where 
there is no contractual obligation to work overtime and the employees refuse to work, that will 
not amount to a strike and the definition includes voluntary overtime.  
A secondary strike, also known as a sympathy strike, is a strike in which employees strike to 
assist employees engaged in a different strike.74 Hence, this kind of strike is in support of a 
primary strike. Further, this strike need not be a total refusal to work by employees. A strike is 
not classified as a secondary strike if the employees have referred their demands to a council 
and if the employees have a material interest in the demand.75 Secondary strikers are afforded 
protection only if the primary strike has satisfied the requirements of the LRA.76 Should the 
secondary strike not comply with the required requirements then the secondary employer can 
approach the Labour Court for an interdict.  
In Clidet No 957 (Pty) Ltd v SAMWU,77 the court held that establishing whether secondary 
strikes are protected and permissible, entails examining the likely result on the secondary 
employer, having regard to the duration and form of the secondary strike, the number of 
employees involved, their conduct, the extent of the strike’s impact on the secondary employer 
and on the sector in which they occur.78 In SALGA v SAMWU,79 it was held that because the 
municipalities provide a number of functions for the provincial and national tiers of 
government, a strike by municipal workers in support of a nationwide strike by public servants 
would have complied with the requirements of the LRA.80 
 
                                                             
71 SR van Jaarsveld and BPS van Eck Principles of Labour Law (1998) 320.   
72 Cohen (note 54 above) 46. 
73 Ibid; Grogan (note 46 above) 406. 
74 R Bregman ‘Strikes’ (2014), available at https://www.bregmans.co.za/strikes/. (Accessed: 7 August 2018).  
75 Ibid. 
76 Grogan (note 46 above) 417. 
77 [2011] 3 BLLR 225 (LC). 
78 Grogan (note 46 above) 417. 
79 [2011] 7 BLLR 649 (LAC). 
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2.4 Protected and unprotected strikes 
In the LRA there are two different kinds of strikes which are: protected and unprotected strikes. 
Section 67 of the LRA contains protected strikes. For brevity, these are strikes that fulfil the 
requirements in sections 64 of the LRA. 81 One of the most important outcomes of a protected 
strike is that employees who are on such a strike may not be unfairly dismissed by their 
employer. 82  On the other hand, section 68 of the LRA regulates unprotected strikes. 
Unprotected strikes are those that do not comply with the procedural requirements in section 
64 of the LRA. Furthermore, a strike is also unprotected if it is disallowed by section 65 (1) of 
the LRA. If employees are engaged in an unprotected strike, the employer can dismiss them as 
the strike is not in compliance with the procedural requirements. Nonetheless, the dismissal 
must be procedural and substantively fair as per the Code of Good Practice. 
Employees on a protected strike are not allowed to act violently, cause damage to property or 
intimidate non-striking employees and employers or take part in other unlawful conduct while 
they are on strike. 
2.5 The right to strike in terms of the Constitution  
Originally, strike action was governed by the common law under breach of contract.83 Under 
the common law, an employer would be able to dismiss an employee who took part in a strike 
action if that employee breached the contract.84 In Smith’s case,85 the court pointed out that if 
an employee participated in a strike, he then breached his contract of employment and such an 
employee could therefore be dismissed for such action. There was no obvious protection of 
employees engaged in strikes against dismissal in the 1956 LRA.86 A clear protection of the 
right to strike is granted by the Constitution and the LRA (1995), as mentioned above.   
The right to strike is incorporated in the Constitution, section 23 (2) (c) and states clearly that 
every worker has a right to strike. 87  However, this right is subject to limitations in the 
Constitution, it is not absolute.88 A Constitutional right to strike is considered as a higher 
                                                             
81 Cohen (note 54 above) 45; Grogan (note 46 above) 412. 
82 Manamela (note 15 above) 326. 
83 Grogan (note 46 above) 405. 
84 A Myburgh ‘100 Years of Strike Law’ (2004) 24 ILJ, 966. 
85  R v Smith (1995) 1 SA 239 (C). 
86 Myburgh (note 84 above) 966. 
87 Section 23 (2)(c) of the Constitution (note 1 above).  
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standard against which ordinary legislation is scrutinised for its similarity.89 Therefore, the 
LRA was enacted to give effect to this right and to limit it. The constitutional right to strike 
can be interpreted as a “means to an end” in that it is a significant way to protect the interest of 
workers.90  
Moreover, section 64 and 65 are the dominating provisions in the LRA for strikes. Hence, 
section 64 provides employees with the right to strike and employers are provided with a right 
to ‘lock-out’. The section further provides procedural requirements which must be complied 
with for a strike to be protected. Section 65 provides for the limitations of the right to strike 
and recourse to ‘lock-out’.91 While the LRA is narrow when it comes to the rights to strike, the 
Constitution widely accommodates persons who wants to strike. The right to strike emanates 
from collective bargaining and it is a tool which unions use to achieve their demands during 
the bargaining process.92   
In NUMSA v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd, 93  the court held that the Constitution recognises the 
importance of ensuring fair labour relations. The court further pointed out that this right is 
important for two reasons: firstly, it is important for the dignity of workers, in that the workers 
may not be treated as coerced employees. Secondly, it will ensure that workers are able to 
reclaim bargaining power during the collective bargaining process.94 
2.6 Limitations to the right to strike 
It is understood that although the constitutional right to strike is unrestricted, like any other 
right in the Constitution, it is not absolute.95 It has been pointed that the right to strike envisages 
restrictions and limitations. 96  Further, the right to strike is restricted in terms of general 
application in terms of section 36 of the Constitution. The limitation to this right should 
however be reasonable and the interests of the society must be balanced against that of affected 
persons.97  
                                                             
89 H Cheadle “Constitutionalising the right to strike” in B Hepple, R Le Roux and S Sciarra (editors) Laws 
against strikes: The South African experience in an international and comparative perspective (2015), 67. 
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91 Section 65 of the LRA (note 5 above). 
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93 (2003) ILJ 316 (CC). 
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The LRA which is a national legislation, was enacted to give effect to the right to strike as it 
was generally stated in the Constitution.98 Even though the LRA gives effect to the right to 
strike, it sets limits to this right. Therefore, certain requirements must be met for a strike to be 
protected. The LRA prescribes to these requirements so that the parties involved in a dispute 
pertaining to a strike, can find a way to settle their dispute. This also helps the employer to get 
ready for any actions that the employees may take. The LRA provides for procedural and 
substantive limitations to the right to strike. 
2.6.1 Procedural Limitations to the right to strike 
Section 64 of the LRA sets out procedural requirements which must be followed prior to a 
strike being protected:99 
(a) The issue in dispute must be referred for conciliation to a bargaining council or 
to the CCMA. 
(b) A certificate stating that the dispute remains unresolved must be issued or 
alternatively a period of 30 days must have lapsed from the date of the referral 
of the dispute. 
(c) The employer must be given at least 48 hours written notice of the 
commencement of the strike.  
Referring a dispute for conciliation 
Referring a matter for conciliation to a bargaining council or the CCMA (Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration) is the first step to be taken.100 The representative of 
the employees’ lists all the issues in dispute when referring the matter, since employees or 
workers can only strike based on the submitted issues for conciliation. The union is the only 
party that can be cited in the referral.101 It must be clear which issue or issues are strikable at 
referral. 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v SAMWU,102 the court found that the 
‘stalemate’ stage had not been reached (that there is no issue in dispute until the employer has 
                                                             
98 Section 23 (5) and (6) of the Constitution (note 1 above); L Corazza “Representativeness and the legitimacy 
of bargaining agency” in B Hepple, R Le Roux and S SCiarra (editors) Laws against strikes: The South African 
experience in an international and comparative perspective (2015), 88. 
99 Section 64 (1) to (5) (note 5 above); Grogan (note 46 above) 412; Van Niekerk (note 26 above) 426. 
100 Grogan (note 46 above) 412; Cohen (note 54 above) 49. 
101 Cohen (note 54 above) 49. 
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had the opportunity to accept or reject a demand put forward by the employees or their 
representative in respect of any of the issues referred for conciliation).103 The union and its 
members were accordingly restrained from striking over those issues.104 
In Early Bird Farm (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and others,105 the company had a farming and processing 
division. The processing division embarked on a strike to settle a wage dispute. The plant 
thereafter followed suit.106 The LAC held that since only the dispute of the processing plant 
employees had been referred for conciliation, the strike on the other division was unprotected. 
However, the court pointed that, to a level that the individual workers engagement in the strike 
was in support of grievances relating only to the union members based in the processing plant, 
such participation was lawful and protected.107 
A certificate with regards to the dispute being obtained  
A certificate must be provided by the CCMA detaining that the issues remains unresolved.108 
The employees may not embark on a strike until the commissioner verified that the parties are 
unable to resolve the dispute, or until 30 days have passed since the date of referral.109 It is best 
for the employees to wait for conciliation so that they will know which matter is not strikable. 
If the matter concerns a refusal to bargain, a non-binding advisory arbitration award must first 
be issued in such a case before proceeding to the next step.110 Furthermore, the fact that the 
certificate has been obtained verifying that the matter remains unresolved does not mean that 
the strike that will ensue is protected from the legal challenge. 111 A good example which 
Grogan uses is that of the case of Vodacom (Pty) Ltd v CWU,112 where the LAC held that a 
strike in conflict with the provisions of a collective agreement was unlawful, even though the 
commissioner had authorised the strike.113 
Giving an employer a written notice of the date for the commencement of the strike 
The union representing the employees must give notice the employer in writing when the strike 
is to begin. The employer must be given at least 48 hours’ notice of the commencement of the 
                                                             
103 Grogan (note 46 above) 413. 
104 Ibid. 
105 (2004) 25 ILJ 2135 (LAC). 
106 Cohen (note 54 above) 49. 
107 Ibid, at para 50. 
108 Section 64(1)(a)(i) (note 5 above). 
109 Section 64(1)(a)(ii) (note 5 above); Grogan (note 46 above) 412. 
110 Section 64(2) (note 5 above); Grogan (note 46 above) 412. 
111 Grogan (note 46 above) 412. 
112 (2010) 31 ILJ 2060 (LAC). 
113 Ibid; Grogan (note 46 above) 412. 
17 
 
strike.114 Furthermore, “where the employer is bound by a bargaining council agreement and 
the issue in dispute relates to a collective agreement to be concluded in the council, notice need 
only be given to the council”.115 In instance where employer is the state, then the notice must 
be given to the State at least seven days before the strike.116 In the case of secondary strikes, 
the employer must be given seven days’ notice. Accordingly, this will allow the employer of 
the secondary strikers to prepare for their absence from work.117 Grogan points out that ‘the 
notice must set out the issues in dispute with reasonable clarity but need not indicate which 
employees will participate in the strike, or in which division of the employer’s workplace it 
will occur.’118  
In the case of SATAWU and others v Moloto NO and others,119  the company employed 
individuals who were members of SATAWU while others were not members of the union. The 
union had provided a single strike notice and some non-members engaged in the strike as well. 
As a result of their engagement on a strike while they were not members of the union, they 
were dismissed for unapproved absence from work. It was found by the Constitutional Court 
that the provisions of section 64 contemplate only a strike in respect of one dispute or issue in 
dispute. The court further found that section 64 does not indicate that more than one notice in 
relation to the single strike is compulsory. The court dismissed the assertion that the employees 
on strike complied with the provisions of section 64(1)(b) by engaging in a strike when only 
SATAWU and not it non-members provided a strike notice. 
In the case of Ceramic Industries Ltd t/a Betta Sanitaryware and others v NCBAWU and 
others,120 the union referred a dispute to the CCMA regarding the payment of wages during an 
early work stoppage. The union gave notice to the company that a strike would begin at any 
time after 48 hours from the date of the notice. The LAC held that the provisions of section 
64(1)(b) of the LRA needed to be interpreted and applied in a way that gave best effect to the 
primary objects of the LRA and its own determined objective, which needed to be done within 
the limitations of the language used in section 64(1)(b).121 The court further pointed out that 
one of the primary objects of the LRA is to advance orderly collective bargaining. Section 
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64(1)(b) give expression to this object by demanding written notice of the commencement of 
the proposed strike. The court found the union’s notice flawed for failing to specify the 
requested time for the beginning of the strike and stated that the provisions of section 64(1)(b) 
were not met. 
Moreover, strikes need not comply with above stated pre-strike procedures in the following 
circumstances:122 
o Where the parties to the dispute are members of a bargaining council and 
the dispute has been dealt with by that bargaining council in accordance with 
its constitution (section 64(3)(a)); 
o Where the parties have complied with the provisions of a collective 
agreement by which they are bound (section 64(3)(b)); 
o Where the strike is in response to an illegal lock-out by the employer 
(section 64(3)(c)); 
o The employer locks out its employees in response to their taking part in a 
strike that does not conform with the provisions of Chapter 4 (section 
64(3)(d));  
o Where the employer has introduced a unilateral change to the employees’ 
terms and conditions of employment and has failed to comply with a request 
that it either refrain from implementing or revoke the change for 30 days 
(section 64(3)(e)). 
2.6.2 Substantive limitations to the right to strike 
Section 65 prohibit strikes in certain circumstances and certain employees are prohibited from 
striking. 123  The section provides that no employee may strike in the following 
circumstances:124  
(a) If employees are bound by collective agreement prohibiting them from striking over the 
disputed issues, or which requires that the dispute be arbitrated section 65(1)(a) and 
(b).  
If there is a contract which was concluded by the employer and the employees’ representative, 
then the employer can rely on that contract for the strike not to take place because it will be 
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unprotected in terms of section 64 of the LRA. The employees may not strike if the 
commissioner ruled that the dispute is covered by collective agreement.125 
In the case of BAWU and others v Asoka Hotel,126 the parties involved fell under the jurisdiction 
of an Industrial Council and were bound by the terms of a gazetted Industrial Council 
agreement which set minimum wages.127 The union requested that the employer negotiate with 
it over a wage increase. However, employer rejected to negotiate, and the union members 
embarked on a strike. Accordingly, the employees that were on strike were dismissed and they 
sought reinstatement in terms of the LRA. The Industrial Court held that the demand for 
negotiations over higher wages was not protected by any provision of the Industrial Council 
agreement and that consequently the strike infringed section 65(1)(a) of the LRA. It was further 
held that it would protect employees who embarked in legal strikes in circumstances where the 
employer neither in good faith nor had proven to be reasonable. Therefore, the court found that 
the employer had dismissed the employees permanently and it was procedurally unfair. 
In Early Bird Farming,128 the LAC held that for the reason that the employees were bound by 
a collective agreement with the union, the farm workers were not permitted to strike over wage 
demands on their behalf. 
(b) The issue in dispute relates to a disagreement which one of the parties can refer to the 
Labour Court or for arbitration (section 65(1)(c)) 
According to Grogan ‘this section is the most extensive statutory limitation on the right to 
strike.’129 The objective behind this subsection is that no employee should be seen striking if 
the matter can be taken to the relevant court where a remedy can be granted. Hence, employees 
may not strike over disputes concerning the following: automatically unfair dismissals, the 
interpretation and application of a collective agreement; picketing; allegations of unfair 
dismissal; unfair labour practices, victimisation; agency and closed shop agreements; 
admission or expulsion from bargaining councils; freedom of association.130  
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According to Grogan, ‘there are two exceptions to the prohibition of strikes over disputes of 
right.’131 The first exception relates to disputes concerning claims by unions for organisational 
rights and the second exception is found in section 189A (9)(2)(b) of the LRA.132   
(c) When employees are engaged in essential or maintenance services (section 65(1)(d)) 
Essential services are those services which protection for life or personal safety is provided.133 
Hence, employees engaged in essential services may not strike.134 In the case of the South 
African Police Services v Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union,135 the Constitutional Court 
held that not all persons engaged in the SAPS would be regarded as essential service members 
who are involved in an essential service. Members of the SAPS not involved in essential 
services may exercise their right to strike. 
Section 70 of the LRA which establishes the Essential Services Committee which is tasked 
with task of determining whether a service falls within the definition of essential service.136 It 
is the task of this committee to examine if a service is essential or not.  
2.7 Conclusion  
Even though a strike is considered to have an adverse effect on the economy, it is acknowledged 
as a fundamental right in South Africa. Section 23 of the Constitution of South Africa was 
entrenched for the purpose of accommodating this right to strike. Further, the LRA was enacted 
to give effect to this right and to make sure that every employee enjoys this right. What is 
important, is that for there to be a strike there must be refusal by employees/workers 
collectively to work because refusal by only ‘one employee/worker’ to work does not constitute 
a strike. The matter must be of mutual interest between the employer and the employees, 
respectively. The Constitution widely accommodates those who wish to engage in a strike 
(workers), while the LRA is limited in this instance (employees). Moreover, the LRA provides 
requirements which must be met for a strike to be protected and the employees to enjoy 
immunity against dismissal. These requirements are provided for in section 64 of the LRA and 
is the most important provision in the LRA regarding strikes. The Act also outlines which 
employees will not be able to participate in a strike due to certain circumstances. Therefore, 
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when employees engage in violent strikes, they violate the laws and procedures which needs 
to be followed. Failure to abide by these laws and procedures are a misuse of the right to strike.  
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CHAPTER 3: REMEDIES AVAILABLE 
3.1 Introduction 
The LRA provides that for a strike to be protected, it must comply with all procedural and 
substantial requirements. This protection by the LRA is offered to employees who engage in a 
protected strike.137 Grogan points out that the “purpose of granting protection to strikers is to 
encourage employees to comply with statutory provisions before and while resorting to 
industrial action.”138 Previously, under the 1956 LRA,139 employees who were engaged in a 
strike but failed to follow the required requirements, faced criminal liability and the possibility 
of being dismissed from work. The current LRA discourages strikes which do not comply with 
the requirements by giving employers certain remedies to exhaust.140 Hence, the employer can 
approach the Labour Court for an interdict prohibiting a strike which does not comply with the 
requirements;141 the employer can sue for compensation for the loss it has suffered as a result 
of an unprotected or violent strike;142 the employer has a remedy where he or she can treat 
participation in an unprotected strike as a form of misconduct;143 and locking-out employees. 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the legal steps available to the employer to prevent violence 
that takes place during a strike. 
3.2 Remedies available to the employer: 
3.2.1 Interdict  
This is one of the remedies available to the employer who is faced with employees who are 
engaged in a strike which has the potential to become violent. Interdicts are intended to protect 
employers from damages that can result from the unprotected or violent strikes and any other 
wrongful act associated with such strikes. In terms of section 68(1) of the LRA the Labour 
Court is granted with complete jurisdiction to grant an interdict to deter any person from 
participating in an unprotected strike or any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of such 
an unprotected strike.144 
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Employers cannot use the restraining order (interdict) as a form to strip employees their right 
to strike which is constitutionally guaranteed. Thus, this would amount to an unreasonable 
limitation of the employees’ constitutional right to strike.145 At least 48-hour notice must be 
given to the employees or to their representative (union) detailing the employer’s purpose to 
interdict the strike. A shorter period may be allowed by courts if the union has been given a 
chance to be heard after the notice of the application and the employer gives a justification why 
a court should allow a shorter period.146 Before granting the relief sought, the employer has to 
establish a prima facie right to the relief sought (even if this may be opened to some doubts); 
whether there are grounds to believe that irreparable harm will be done or is to be done to the 
applicant if the interdict is not granted; whether the balance of convenience favours the grant 
of the relief; and whether no other satisfactory remedy the applicant has.147  
Nevertheless, an interdict can only be functional if it is respected by the strikers or their 
representatives. Employees who are engaged in a strike which tends to be violent has the 
tendency of not obeying the court order prohibiting them from any action which jeopardise the 
employer’s company. Should the strikers or their union fail to obey an interdict, a contempt of 
court application can be applied for.148 In assessing whether there has been contempt of court 
by employees engaged in a violent strike, the case of Fakie149 set out the test for contempt of 
court. Hence, the test for a contempt of court application is to establish whether the breach was 
committed deliberately and mala fide.150 A deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non-
complier may genuinely believe that he is entitled to act in the way claimed to constitute the 
contempt.151  
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In Xtrata South Africa (Pty) Ltd v AMCU,152 the court found that when the union is instructed 
to ensure compliance with an order granted against it members, all that is expected of it is to 
take reasonable steps and measures to ensure that its members comply with the interdict.153  
Furthermore, considering that employees engaged in violent strikes totally disobey court 
interdicts, employers may choose applying for contempt of court against the employees and 
their members. In Modise v Spar Blackheath154 where employees had ignored or disobeyed the 
interdict prohibiting them from striking, the court pointed that compliance with a court order 
is fundamental to a state based on the rule of law and that courts should apply a strict approach 
to ensure that it remains that way.155 If the employees in a violent strike do not obey the 
interdict prohibiting the strike, chaos would erupt, thus defeating the object of the collective 
bargaining. Thus, the court in Modise pointed out that a party who committed an offence should 
be penalised for its non-compliance.156  
In the case of In2Food (Pty) Ltd v FAWU and others157 the parties engaged in an unprotected 
strike for two consecutive weeks. The interim interdict which was applied for by the employer 
was granted by the Labour Court prohibiting the union and its members from unceasing with 
the unprotected strike and from intimidating other employees who were not part of the strike. 
The interdict was not challenged by the union, however, the strike became violent and there 
was damage to property. A contempt of court application was brought forward by the employer. 
On reading the evidence, the court noted that the union and its striking members were in 
contempt of court. The court held that the right to strike is protected in the Constitution but 
there are limitations to that right. It was further held that the union cannot escape liability for 
actions of its members, and it will therefore be held liable. The union was ordered to pay a fine 
of a half a million rands (R500 000).158 The most significant points which the court noted are 
that, the time has come for unions to be held liable for their actions and that for too long trade 
unions have easily washed their hand of the violent actions of their members.159 
Clearly, an interdict is to the advantage of the employer since it is a speedy way of solving the 
issue at point and the employer not be facing the possibility of a full trial. However, it has been 
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argued that there is nothing much that the Labour Court can do to guarantee that strikers comply 
with strike interdicts against them.160 This has led to other writers labelling violent strikes as 
more political in nature than legal.161 Considering non-compliance of an interdict by strikers 
on violent strike, employers should consider taking further legal action against the employees 
in order to curb violence during a strike. 
3.2.2 Compensation  
Section 68(1)(b) of the LRA permits the Labour Court jurisdiction to order payment of  “just 
and equitable compensation" for any loss incurred due to the unprotected or violent strike.162 
It has been held that the words ‘just and equitable’ means more than that compensation awarded 
must be fair.163 Initially, the employer needs to prove that it has suffered loss as a result of a 
violent strike before the court grants compensation, and that the loss was a result of the 
respondent’s participation in the unprotected strike.164   
Furthermore, in determining whether compensation should be awarded, the court must consider 
the following elements, whether:165 
 attempts were made to comply with the provisions of the LRA and the extent of 
such attempts; 
 the strike was premeditated (was there compliance with the LRA provisions in 
relation to strikes); 
 the strike was a response to the employer’s unjustified conduct; 
 there was compliance with an earlier interdict or restraining order by the trade union 
and their members. 
The above elements are not the only that the court can consider in assessing just and equitable 
payment of compensation; the court will also look if there are any other elements which can be 
considered. In Algo Bus Company v SATAWU and others,166 the union and its members had 
been sued by the company for loss of a large sum of money it incurred because of the unlawful 
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strike. The court pointed out that if it is proven that the strike induced loss to the employer and 
that it was a disruption to the public, then the employer would be allowed to be compensated 
for the loss suffered. 167  The court held that while employers are permitted to claim 
compensation for losses suffered during an unlawful strike, the amount awarded for such loss 
need not necessarily be complete compensation for such loss.168 The union and its members 
were ordered to pay the company one hundred thousand rands in monthly instalments of R50. 
This case clearly shows that the court awarded a small amount than the damage which the 
company had suffered (financial loss of R465 000). 
In Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd v Mouth Piece Workers Union,169 the company had suffered 
a loss estimated at R15 million but was reduced to R100 000. It was noted by the court that the 
union’s representatives had not opposed the company’s allegations that they were behind the 
strike.170 The court held that the employer would only be entitled to compensation which is just 
and equitable. It was pointed out by the court that what is regarded as just and equitable is 
calculated by the weighing up of the loss suffered against the nature of the conduct and 
blameworthiness of the individuals responsible for the loss.171  
In Mangaung Local Municipality v SAMWU,172 the court refused to compensate the employer 
for loss of income resulting from employees who were not part of the strike, but being unable 
to attend work because of a blockade by the strikers.173 It was held that the union’s liability 
emerged from its failure to take precautions to end the strike.174 Hence, the union was ordered 
to pay compensation to the employer amounted to R25 000 notwithstanding the fact that the 
employer suffered a loss of R272 541, 84. 
3.2.3 Discouragement 
Discouragement is one of the remedies at the employer’s disposal in addition to interdicts and 
compensation. Employees engaged in a strike may be discouraged by the employer if they did 
not follow the procedure stipulated in the LRA.175 One of the strategies which the employer 
can use in discouraging employees involved in an unprotected strike is withholding their 
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salaries and wages (since all strikes are no work no pay), encourage them not to strike 
(especially if the strike has the tendency of turning violent), and giving non-striking employees 
additional salaries such as bonuses for their commitment to work even in the face of 
difficulties.176 For the employer, it is difficult to discourage employees who are on violent 
strike, simply because they are not protected. Hence, should the employer suffer any damages 
during the strike, these employees will be liable and can be dismissed from work, even if no 
damages were sustained they can still be dismissed.   
The employers try to curtail violence that takes place during strikes by concluding collective 
agreements that will balance the employer and employee(s) relationship. 177  ‘Collective 
agreements’ can discourage strikes because they stipulate which issues the employees are not 
allowed to strike over. By this they try to minimise violence that can ensue even if the strike is 
protected. Hence, the reason why collective agreement is concluded is because employers and 
unions are free to agree to choose any other ways of resolving disputes which can arise, and 
especially if the strike did not follow the requirements in the LRA.178 If the employees are 
involved in a protected strike, the employer may withhold wages or use other means of 
discouraging employees to strike (as discussed above), provided that employees do not unfairly 
discriminate against the strikers or amount to victimisation.179 Furthermore, there are two 
forms of collective agreement which are, ‘agency shop agreements’ (which is provided for in 
section 25(1) of the LRA and is concluded between a majority union and the employer) and a 
‘closed shop agreements’ (which is provided for in section 26(1) of the LRA and is concluded 
between the employer and a trade union).180 
In SACCAWU v OK Bazaar, 181  the court held that, in so far as it remains applicable, 
withholding bonuses permitted for work completed or remunerating non-strikers with 
additional bonuses or benefits may be permissible in the case of unprotected strikes.182  
Nevertheless, Grogan points out that the ‘courts will probably investigate such stratagems more 
strictly under the current LRA,’ so that there will be no unfair discrimination against strikers 
or them being victimised. 183 
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3.2.4 Disciplinary action 
The employees conduct is regulated by the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, in Schedule 8 
of the LRA.184 The Code of Good Practice provides that instigation or participation in an 
unprotected strike, by a union or their members, may effectively be regarded as a form of 
misconduct justifying dismissal.185 This entitles employers to take disciplinary action short of 
dismissal against employees who were engaged in an unprotected strike, especially if it was 
violent, when they return to work.186 
In the case of Mzeku,187 an unprotected strike took place and as a result the dismissal of the 
union’s members ensue for failing to follow a fair final demand. The employees on strike 
continued with their unprotected strike against their union’s advice not to strike. Hence, a 
collective agreement and a court order was breached costing their employer huge financial loss. 
The strikers conduct was intentional and wilful misconduct without any ground of justification 
that was reasonable against their employer’s conduct. A total of 1336 employee were dismissed 
from their work after the union and the employer had done everything to stop the unprotected 
strike. The court found that the dismissal of the employees was substantively and procedural 
fair. Hence, the employees were given a chance to be heard pursuant the dismissal. It was found 
that the commissioner had incorrectly found that the dismissal of those workers who failed to 
continue their work would have been fair had the employer followed a fair procedure.188 It was 
further held that the reinstatement and re-employment of workers were not appropriate 
remedies in the circumstances. The court concluded by not making an order of reinstatement 
simply because it said that such relief was not appropriate in this case of a dismissal that was 
unfair because the employer did not follow a legitimate procedure.  
Employees who are unhappy about their employer’s decision of dismissing them for being part 
of the unprotected strike can oppose their employer’s action in the appropriate bargaining 
council or the CMMA.189 The employees on an unprotected or violent strike must first be given 
warnings before being dismissed.  Furthermore, employers sometimes find it difficult to 
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dismiss employees who participated in in a violent strike since it may not be easy to identify 
the offender if there were no cameras or a whistle-blower.190  
In NSCAWU and others v Coin Security Group (Pty) Ltd,191 employees were dismissed by the 
employer after a strike that involved misconduct. It was held that although the employees were 
involved in collective action, there was no proof that any of the employees were directly 
involved in the misconduct they were dismissed for. It was pointed out that the employer relied 
on the collective guilt more than on the doctrine of common purpose. The court’s conclusion 
was that in terms of the law, there was no collective guilt because this would contravene the 
principle of natural justice that provides that everyone is innocent until proven guilty.   
3.2.5 Lock-out 
This is another remedy which is available to the employer against employees who participated 
in an unprotected strike or one that was violent. Hence, this recourse is provided by the LRA 
to the employer who may use it until the employees comply with the employer’s plan.192 
Section 213 of the LRA defines a lock-out as “the exclusion by an employer of employees from 
the employer’s workplace, for the purpose of compelling the employees to accept a demand in 
respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the employee, whether or 
not the employer breaches the employees contracts of employment in the course of or for the 
purpose of exclusion”.193 When locking out the employees, the employer may refuse to pay 
those employees involved in a violent or unprotected strike.194 In addition, such refusal to pay 
remuneration is supported by the LRA.195  
3.3 Conclusion 
The LRA is fair legislation as it provides protection to both employees and employers. 
Employers are not left without any remedy they can rely on should the strike turn violent or be 
unprotected. Hence, the employer has remedies he or she can rely on to reduce violence that 
takes place during a strike. By concluding a collective agreement, the employer and employees 
agree that there are certain matters which they cannot strike over. Employees most of the time 
fail to follow picketing rules and ‘cross the line’ by engaging in violent strikes which compels 
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the employer to obtain an interdict in order to prohibit them from engaging in violent actions 
that can cause massive damage to the company. Moreover, if that prohibitory interdict is 
disobeyed (as it normally happens) the employer can make an application for contempt of court 
and an appropriate compensation can be made by the court against the union and its members 
for their involvement in a violent strike. An interdict can only be functional if it is respected 
by the union and its members. 
Employers may also use certain measures to discourage employees from engaging in violent 
or unprotected strikes. An employer is entitled to dismiss employees engaged in violent strikes 
for committing misconduct justifying dismissal. However, the dismissal needs to be 
substantively and procedural fair to the employees. Locking out employees is also another 
remedy which the employer can make use of if they continue with their violent strikes.  
Some of these remedies have not helped employers and it is up to the courts to treat each case 
according to its own facts. The courts must make sure that awards which they give employers 
who suffered damages due to violent strikes are the appropriate ones, and that will deter 
employees from engaging in violent strikes in future because they will be aware of the 
consequences that can arise from such strikes.  
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CHAPTER 4: TRADE UNIONS LIABILITY FOR VIOLENT STRIKES 
4.1 Introduction 
Protected or unprotected strikes are considered violent where damage to property, looting, 
intimidation, assaults, etc. occurs. It is the trade union’s role to make sure that such violent 
actions are not committed by its members. Hence, there is an obligation imposed on trade 
unions to take all reasonable steps to halt violence and any other misconduct committed during 
a strike.196 Gericke asserts that “the primary role of trade unions is to serve the interests of their 
members who need the collective voice of a stronger party to uphold the members’ right.”197  
As members of a trade union, employees are allowed to utilise their right to strike as collective. 
Thus, it is the trade union that is entrusted with the duty to organise such action for the 
employees and it is in this respect that every trade union balance relations between employees 
and employers. 198 
Considering that trade unions are representatives of employees, trade unions can be held 
accountable for any delictual violations that are committed by the employees during strikes.199 
Hence, the employers should lay charges against trade unions for wrongs committed by 
employees who are members to those unions. The reason why employers chose to institute 
action against a trade union is the fact that it becomes difficult for the employer to identity 
individual employees who were engaged in violent strikes or wrongful acts and employees 
cannot pay on their own.200 Trade unions are in a better position to satisfy the claim by the 
employer against them and they are expected to take positive steps to ensure that employees 
are behaving during a strike and their actions are within the law.201 
4.2 The rights of trade unions 
In South Africa, every employee has the Constitutional right to form and be part of a trade 
union subject to its constitution. 202 Trade unions are also given rights by the Constitution and 
the LRA and these rights must be respected by the trade unions. Hence, trade unions rights 
include: the right to access the employer’s premises to talk to the union members or to recruit 
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new members; conduct union elections or ballots at the workplace; right to elect trade union 
representatives; being consulted before disciplinary of a shop steward; holding meeting with 
employees outside working hours; instruct the employer to make deductions of and pay over 
union membership subscription for employees; the right to be recognised as the employees 
representatives; the right to access to information; apply for admission to bargaining councils; 
and the right to appoint shop stewards.203 These rights are most important for trade unions and 
they must be followed by each trade union as liability will emerge from the rights they are 
afforded.  
4.3 Trade unions duties  
In addition to the rights which trade unions have, they also have duties which are relevant to 
their accountability. Hence, all trade unions have the following duties:  
to keep books and records of its income, expenditure, assets and liabilities, prepare 
financial statements, and to preserve them for a minimum of three years; have its books 
and records audited for that year; make financial statements and the auditor’s report 
available to members for inspection, and to submit them at members meetings; to keep 
a list of members, minutes of meetings and ballot papers for at least three years; to 
provide the registrar of the High Court with a copy of the auditor’s report, the names 
and addresses of officer-bearers, notice of change of address and, by 31 March each 
year, a statement regarding the number of members; and to send the Registrar of the 
High Court a copy of any resolution taken to amend its constitution, and the secretary’s 
certificate that such resolution complies with the constitution.204 
Trade unions have a duty to make sure that the strike follows proper procedures which are 
stipulated in the LRA. Failure by a trade union to take proper and necessary reasonable steps 
to eradicate unlawful conduct during strike by their members, could mean that they will face 
severe consequences.205 Hence, the trade union is expected to instruct its members not to 
engage in violent conducts that can cause damage to the employer’s business. Therefore, a 
union cannot escape the conduct of its members, officials and shop stewards and can be held 
liable for delictual damages due to the culpability of the union, which caused a loss to the 
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employer.206 If the union fails on its duty to control the strike when it turns violent, it can be 
held liable for acts of its members, if the employer can prove that there was a violent or 
wrongful act committed by its employees. In Mondi Ltd v CEPPWAWU and others,207 during 
a protected strike, employees who were on strike switched off the employer’s machinery and 
the employer incurred damages of R673 000. 208  The employer thereafter claimed these 
damages from the union. The court held that in order to for the union to be held vicariously 
liable for its members’ action, it must be shown that they acted with common purpose by 
allowing the employees’ behaviour. However, it was found that there was inadequate evidence 
to identify the employees responsible for switching off the machine, and therefore that the 
union could not be held vicariously liable.209 In Eskom Ltd case,210 Eskom sued the union for 
more than R6 million in damages caused by union members who were part of a union-organised 
demonstration, which turned violent and damage to property was suffered. Eskom claimed that 
the union was vicariously liable for the damages.211 
In Richfield Graduate Institute of Technology v Private Schools and Allied Workers Union and 
others,212 the union was instructed to take particular steps to bring an unprotected strike and 
associated violence to an end. These included publicly calling on the strikers to respect the 
court order by reading it out using a loud-hailer in the language that is used for communication 
on the employer’s premises. In addition, the union was directed to report to the court after three 
days by way of affidavit to show that those involved have complied with the terms of the 
interim order.213 The union did not comply with the instruction from the court and it made no 
attempt to comply. It was accordingly found to be in obvious disregard of the interim court 
order and the court concluded that a severe suspended fine should be imposed against the Union 
as a reminder that court orders are to be taken seriously in future. This case shows that duties 
which the union owes to the members needs to be followed in such a way that if the union is 
given a role to regulate the strike so that it does not escalate to violence it should do so without 
hesitating.  
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Moreover, a trade union has duty to discourage its members from participating in an 
unprotected strike which tends to turn violent. In Algoa Bus (Pty) Ltd v Transport Action Retail 
and General Workers Union and others,214 a claim for compensation was lodged against a 
union emerging from an unprotected strike which the union’s members embarked on that lasted 
for about seven days. The Labour Court issued an order in terms of which the union and its 
members who participated in a strike were held jointly and severally liable to pay the employer 
R1 406 285, 33. The union was ordered to pay this amount in monthly instalments of R5 280, 
50 and its members to pay R214, 50 per month. Clearly, the amount which the union and its 
members were required to pay is the losses which the employer suffered when the strike did 
not stop after the interdict was issued and the union took no positive steps to stop the strike.  
4.4 Liability of a trade union to its members 
Technically, trade unions have the capacity and are in charge of taking decisions on behalf of 
their members. Hence, ‘they are required to seek approval from their members before 
concluding a collective agreement.’215 By so doing, they are required to uphold interests of 
most of the members, even if this will be unfavourable to the minority. Grogan asserts that 
“this proposition has its roots in the principle of majoritarianism and is supported by section 
200 of the LRA.”216 The Labour Court confirmed the proposition that trade unions represent 
their members on the principle of majoritarianism.217 However, there are instances where union 
members can claim damages against the union for neglecting in its mandates and duties.  
In Ngcobo v FAWU, 218 the court had to decide whether members may sue their union for 
damages emanating from the union’s negligent failure to pursue an unfair dismissal action on 
their behalf in the Labour Court.219 The two employees were retrenched by Nestle SA during 
a restructuring exercise. The union referred the matter to the CCMA on the employees’ behalf 
but later failed to attend to the matter until it prescribed (90-day period lapsed). The union 
thereafter referred the matter to an attorney for an opinion on the prospects of success of on the 
matter and the attorney believed they will not succeed. When the employees pressurise the 
union with legal action, it denied that they were members by the time they were dismissed. 
However, the court found that the employees were members of the union, and that the union 
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had breached an obligation to provide them with legal assistance.220 The union had contended 
that it would be against public interest to allow members to sue their own unions. The court 
dismissed this argument. The court awarded each of the two employees with compensation 
equalling to 12 months. Cleary the union failed on its obligation to prevent prejudice to its 
members when it had agreed to help them. 
FAWU appealed to the SCA which was split on the matter and held in favour of the 
employees.221 It was noted by the majority that the claim by employees was based on a breach 
of contract, not on delict. The SCA held that the union consented to help these two employees 
as members under the contract of mandate. Thus, the union was compelled to perform its 
functions, honestly, faithfully, and with care and diligence. The union’s failure to refer the 
matter and apply for condonation in time was in breach of its duty to act honestly or diligently. 
Therefore, the SCA dismissed the appeal.  
The matter went to the Constitutional Court which upheld the SCA’s judgment.222 The union 
contended that it is afforded special protection under the Constitution and the LRA. The 
argument by the union was rejected. It was held that the union could not follow its own interests 
with exemption when it has caused damage to the members by failing to represent them 
properly. The constitution of the union recommended that the union will bear responsibility for 
negligent action of its office bearers.223 The union’s constitution could not be interpreted to 
mean that it could desert its members after agreeing to help them, and that if a union is allowed 
to withdraw from agreements to assist its members, it must do so in good time. Further, the 
court held that the union could not depend on the fact that the employees could have applied 
for condonation themselves. Clearly, the union had breached its obligation by not referring the 
matter on time. Therefore, the court held it could not be argued that the employees had tacitly 
agreed that the union could refer the dispute at any stage, regardless of the statutory deadline.224 
The union was liable to pay the employees compensation equal to 12 months. 
Although the above case is not about violent conduct committed by employees during a strike, 
it is a good example of a union liability to its members where it has acted negligently in 
pursuing the dispute for its members. Hence, FAWU was held to be liable to compensate its 
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members who were retrenched. Trade unions cannot escape liability where it has not acted 
honestly and faithfully in perform its functions.  
In SAMWU v Jada and others,225 the respondents who were all members of the union, sued the 
union after they were dismissed for engaging in an unprotected strike. 226  The dismissed 
employees argued that the union owed them duty of care which it did not uphold as they were 
dismissed, and that the duty was breached. The court expressed uncertainty about whether 
union members may sue their union merely because it happens to be an independent juristic 
entity. 227  The judge pointed out that unlike shareholders of a company who can sue the 
company, trade union members have a clear identity of interest with the union.228 The court 
found that the union did not entice the strike and that the employees had engaged in a strike 
knowing very well that they might be dismissed, and they had assumed that risk. 
The above cases represent instances where the union members failed in their action for 
claiming damages from the union. It is clear that the employees are entrusted with the task to 
prove that the union is the cause of the loss they have suffered. 
4.5 KPMM Road and Earthworks (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction 
Union and others (2018) 39 ILJ 606 (LC)  
In KPMM Road and Earthworks229  the LC had granted an interim order interdicting the 
members of the union who were participating in a protected strike from engaging in unlawful 
and violent acts, included harming, intimidating, threatening or assaulting non-striking 
employees and subcontractors, blocking access to and egress from the applicant employer’s 
site, blockading a portion of the national road leading to the cite of the employer. 230                               
In terms of the interdict the union had ‘to take reasonable steps within its powers’ to prompt its 
members not to engage in such unlawful conduct.231 The order was served to the union and the 
striking employees were given copies thereof. Notwithstanding the order being served to the 
union and its members, the striking employees continued with their unlawful conduct. The 
employer, being concerned, wrote letters to the union complaining about the action of the 
employees, but no response was received. An application for contempt of court was launched 
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after the strike had ceased.232  The court granted an interim order summoning on the union and 
the employees to show why they should not be held in contempt for their failure to obey the 
interim order.233 The court strongly condemned unlawful conduct, violence and intimidation 
during the course of a protected strike and its harmful effect on collective bargaining. 
Regarding the issue of contempt, the court noted that it had to be satisfied, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that there was a refusal to comply with the order; that this refusal was wilful; and that 
the deliberate refusal to comply was mala fide.234 
The court acknowledged that both the union and the employees had proper service of the order 
granted against them, that they were aware of its contents and knew what they had to do to 
comply with it. However, the union argued that the employer had failed to identify each and 
every individual perpetrator of the unlawful conduct constituting the breach, and that the 
employees could therefore not be held in contempt. The court rejected this argument and held, 
relying on the approach of earlier judgments, that it was not necessary for the employer to 
identify each and every perpetrator.235 The court further held that, where all the employees 
acted in concert, and with common purpose, as they did, they could all be held accountable for 
violation  of the order, even if perpetrated by unidentified individuals.236 If employees are given 
a chance to come forward and explain why they should not be held in contempt, they should 
do so, if however, they fail to do so, they will be held in contempt. 
In addition, the union contended that it had complied with the obligations imposed on it by the 
interim order. The court agreed that the obligations imposed on the employees by the order had 
to be distinguished from those imposed on the union, however, they could not be separated 
especially where the obligation imposed on the union was to take ‘all reasonable steps with its 
powers’ to ensure that the employees did not participate in the unlawful conduct specified in 
the order.237 The court considered prior authorities on the concept of ‘reasonable steps’, and 
held that the conduct of the union in this matter fell short of what could legitimately be 
considered to be reasonable measures to intervene and encourage the striking employees to 
comply with the order. Further it was held that actual and positive intervention by the union 
was needed including continuous marshalling of the striking employees, having a constant 
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presence at the premises to deal with violations of the order in interfering urgently and 
immediately when instances of breaches were brought to its attention.238 Nevertheless, what 
the union did was to transfer the order to its striking members, telling them to comply, and then 
it washed its hands of what happened thereafter. Therefore, the court was satisfied that the 
union had not complied with its obligations in terms of the order and it was in breach of that 
order and that both the union and striking employees had acted in wilful and mala fide breach 
of the court order.239 
As to the penalty to be imposed, the court agreed with prior judgements that the principal aim 
was to ensure compliance and not punishment. As the strike had ended the primary objective 
of ensuring compliance was no longer an issue, and the penalty of imprisonment was no longer 
appropriate. Therefore, the court was of the view that the imposition of a fine was appropriate, 
both as a warning and to serve the interest of society by ensuring the integrity of the rule of law 
and respect for the orders of court.240 Thus, the court determined that the fine of R1 000 000 
suspended for three years be imposed against the union and the employees were fined R1 000 
each (which was going to be deducted from their remuneration).241  
The author strongly agrees with the approach which the LC followed in its judgment. Relying 
on the above case, unions are expected to take reasonable steps in making sure that violent 
conduct does not occur during a strike, especially if the court has issued an order against such 
actions by strikers. The union will do this by guarding every move that the strikers engage in 
which could exceed the right to strike, they also have to ensure that all the strikers do is within 
the bounds of the Constitution and the LRA. Hence, unions should continuously monitor a 
strike embarked on by its members. The penalty which the court imposed against the union in 
the case under discussion is the appropriate one, as this will send the right message to other 
trade unions that failure on part of the trade unions to take the proper and necessary reasonable 
steps to eliminate unlawful and violent conduct in the course of strike action by their members, 
could mean that they will face severe consequence. Considering that this is a recent judgement, 
other courts ought to follow it when dealing with violent conducts committed during a strike 
and establishing union liability. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
Although trade unions have rights and duties in terms of the Constitution and the LRA, they 
will never escape liability if it is proved that they have breached their duties in taking care of 
their members. It has pointed out that “it is entirely reasonable for an employer to expect 
protected industrial action to be accompanied by the orderly conduct by those employees who 
have embarked on the industrial action. This is particularly so in circumstances where the 
employer has not only entered into picketing rules agreement with the representative trade 
union regulating the conduct of striking employees but has as a result of the conduct of the 
employees been forced to obtain an interdict restraining the striking employees from 
committing misconduct.”242 However, the facts that trade unions can be held liable for the acts 
of its members does not assist in deciding whether the trade union, in its own right breached a 
court order.243 Thus, the union is expected to continuously take positive steps to bring violent 
strikes to an end to avoid liability. Moreover, even the union members can hold liable the union, 
for loss the members have suffered because of negligence of a trade union. Therefore, trade 
unions are expected to discourage any violent conduct during a strike and illegal activities that 
the employees might engage in.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
242 See Dunlop Mixing and Technical Services (Pty) Ltd and other v National of Metalworkers of SA of on 
behalf of Khanyile and others (2016) 37 ILJ 2065 (LC) at para 77.  
243 See Food and Allied Workers Union v In2Food (Pty) Ltd (2014) 35 ILJ 2767 (LAC) at para 12. 
40 
 
CHAPTER 5: MISCONDUCT COMMITTED DURING STRIKES AND THE 
LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES OF TRADE UNIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
Violent strikes equal to the abuse of the right to strike and is the reversal of constitutional 
values. Hence, employers are commonly at the receiving end of such violence. Strike violence 
comprises serious misconduct and usually renders continued employment relationships 
intolerable.244  Coetzer and Mulligan asserts that in many occasions, “such conduct comprises 
criminal conduct and is particularly egregious in the context of the workplace, given the duty 
of subordination and good faith owed by the employee to the employer.”245 Thus, employers 
are not simply expected to permit employees who participated in vicious intimidation of non-
striking employees, destruction to property or violence to continue their functions with other 
employees as if nothing happened.  
In addition, whilst the right to strike is statutorily protected, and ‘employees can participate in 
a strike once the designated requirements have been complied with, employees should not 
make themselves guilty of misconduct during a strike action.’246 Violence during strikes has 
become a serious problem in our country. For example in the Garvas247 case, some fifty people 
allegedly lost their lives and there was damage to property estimated to more than a million 
rands during a strike by security industry employees who were members of SATAWU.248 
Another good example is the Marikana strike which took place in 2012 where as a result of 
violent conduct mineworkers and police officers died, others were injured and there was 
massive damage to property. The LRA does not encourage violent action by employees during 
a strike even if the strike is protected.  
Moreover, unions will not escape liability to the public (third parties) for misconduct 
committed by its striking members during a strike which resulted in the damage to property 
and any loss suffered by the third parties. The liability in such instances is created by the 
Regulation of Gatherings Act (RGA).249 This chapter will focus on how the RGA creates 
liability of a trade union to third parties and discuss the relevant case law.  
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5.2 Misconduct committed during a strike by striking employees 
When an employer has a ground to believe that the employee has committed serious 
misconduct during a strike, it may be required for an employer to conduct an investigation. 
Specific acts of misconduct which may be committed by employees during a strike includes 
damage to property, assault and intimidation. To justify dismissal, the damage to property must 
be deliberate and serious.250 The employee’s action must be intentionally directed towards the 
destruction of property. In terms of item 3(4) of the Code of Good Practice, wilful damage to 
property of the employer comprises serious misconduct.251 
In addition, assault as a specific act of misconduct is “unlawful and intentional application of 
force to a person, or threat that such force will be applied.”252 Threat of violence may be 
sufficient, it does not need to be real application of physical force and assault includes different 
personal interaction (shoving non-striking employees, employers, customers, etc during a 
violent strike being the most common). In terms of item 3(4) of the Code, physical assault of 
the employer, a fellow employee, a client, or a customer, is a serious act of misconduct.253 
Lastly, intimidation which entails threat uttered seriously, is a ground for dismissal.254  In 
Adcock Ingram Critical Care v CCMA and others, 255  it was stated that to constitute 
intimidation words need not be directed at particular persons. It was further held that words are 
intimidatory if they are calculated to ‘terrify’, ‘overcome’, or ‘cow’. 
In National Union of Mineworkers and others v Letropower (Pty),256  the court held that, 
employees who misconduct themselves during a strike, protected or unprotected, ought not to 
anticipate this court to come to intervene in any subsequent litigation, let alone order of 
reinstatement. Unfortunately, intimidation, assault and damage to property have come to 
distinguish strikes to the extent that they appear to be considered an inevitable consequence 
and essential component of the exercise of the right to strike. The court stated that it expresses 
its dissatisfaction of any act of misconduct committed during a strike and which impacts 
materially and negatively on the rights of the employer and those employees who elect not to 
participate in the strike.   
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In the case of Dunlop Mixing and Technical Services (Pty) Ltd and others,257  employees 
initiated a protected strike in support of wage demands. Many employees committed acts of 
misconduct and violence during the strike. The employer obtained an interdict from the LC in 
an effort to put a stop to the unlawful conduct. Notwithstanding the order being obtained, the 
employees continued with misconducting themselves until the dates of their dismissals on the 
grounds of ‘derivative misconduct’. The employees thereafter referred the matter to CCMA as 
an unfair dismissal. The CCMA found that the derivative misconduct originated from the fact 
that the non-violent striking employees failed to come forward and assist the employer in 
identifying the employees who had used violence.258 The CCMA came to the conclusion that 
the dismissals were both substantively and procedurally fair. However, it was found that the 
dismissal of certain employees was substantively unfair in that there was not enough evidence 
to implicate those employees present during the strike. Thus, the employer was ordered to 
reinstate those employees. The employer applied to the LC to have the award by the CCMA 
reviewed.  
The LC held that it was not unreasonable to deduce from all evidence that all the striking 
employees were participants in the strike and accordingly, in the absence of any explanation, 
were to be regarded as being present during the strike. Further held that, ‘in light of the trust 
nature of an employment relationship there is an obligation on those it can be inferred were 
present, to give evidence or provide some explanation’ as to the identity of the perpetrators or 
their own innocence.259 The court pointed out that an employee who claims to have no such 
information cannot simply claim to remain silent.260 It was further pointed out that where 
employees remain silent, in circumstances where misconduct has been committed, the only 
reasonable inference that could be drawn is that they committed derivative misconduct.261 
Therefore, the court stated that had the employees not been present when the misconduct took 
place, they would have said so. The court concluded that due to the violent nature of the 
misconduct, the employees’ failure to provide information about the violent perpetrators, or to 
offer valid explanation to the employer as to their innocence, constituted derivative misconduct 
which justified their dismissal. 262   
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5.3 Trade union liability to third parties in terms of the Regulation of Gatherings Act 205 
of 1993 (hereinafter referred to as RGA) 
Membership of a trade union does not make a person liable for any of the duties or liabilities 
of the union.263 Those performing functions on behalf a trade union, even members, cannot be 
personally liable for any loss suffered by any person because of an act performed in good faith 
for the union. Nevertheless, a trade union as a legal person is liable for its debts.264 Trade 
unions, registered and unregistered, are liable for damages emanating from demonstrations by 
its members. Courts have dismissed the controversy that to allow those who have suffered 
damages because of demonstrations by unions to sue the organising union for damages would 
hinder their rights to bargain.265 The RGA, which allows such actions, has been held to conform 
to the Constitution.266 
The RGA was inaugurated as an effort to integrate the right of those assembling with the state’s 
interest in maintaining public order.267 Distinction should be made between a gathering and a 
demonstration. In terms of the RGA a demonstration means “any demonstration by one or more 
persons, but not more than 15 persons, for or against any person, cause, action or failure to take 
action”.268 On the other side, gathering means “any assembly, concourse or procession of more 
than 15 persons in or on any public road as defined in the Road Traffic Act 29 of 1989, or any 
other public place or premises wholly or partly open to the air.”269 Furthermore, the RGA 
acknowledges everyone’s right to assemble and protest peacefully and the authorities have a 
duty to facilitate this through negotiations with those who organised such events if necessary.270 
Nonetheless, where riot results in damages participants in that gathering can be held liable in 
terms of section 11 of the RGA.271 
In addition, section 11 of the RGA provides as follows:272 
(1) if any riot damage occurs as a result of a gathering, every organisation on behalf of 
or under the auspice of which held, or if so not held,, the convener; a demonstration, 
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every person participating in such demonstration, shall, subject to subsection (2), be 
jointly and severally liable for that riot damage as a joint wrongdoing contemplated in 
Chapter II of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956, together with any other 
person who unlawfully caused or contributed to such riot damage and any other 
organisation or person who is liable thereof in terms of this subsection. 
Section 11 creates specific statutory liability additionally to any other common law liability 
based on delictual principles that may exist.273 Le Roux points that “unlike liability based on 
delictual principles, the statutory liability created by section 11(1) does not require that the 
organisation concerned, or its office bearers intentionally or negligently causes the riot 
damage.”274 Those who claim that they had suffered loss need to prove that the loss was as a 
result of a riot damage. Hence, riot damage is defined as “any loss suffered as a result of any 
injury to or the death of any person, or any damage to or destruction of any property, caused 
directly or indirectly by, and immediately before, during or after, the holding of a gathering”.275 
Section 17 of the Constitution affords everyone the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket, and 
present petitions.276 Hence, this section places a duty on trade unions to ensure that it is 
exercised peacefully. Section 11(2) of the RGA provides for statutory defence against statutory 
liability found in section 11(1), and requires a person or organisation to prove that:277 
(a) he or it did not permit or connive at the act or omission which caused the damage in 
question; 
 (b) the act or omission in question did not fall within the scope of the objectives of the 
gathering or demonstration in question and was not reasonably foreseeable; and  
 (c) he or it took all reasonable steps within his or its power to prevent the act or 
omission in question: provided that proof that he or it forbade an act of the kind in 
question shall not by itself be regarded as sufficient proof that he or it took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the act in question. 
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In the Garvas case,278 SATAWU assembled a march in support of a protected strike that its 
members had embarked upon and that took place in the Cape Town city centre. During this 
march which comprised a gathering as defined in the RGA, acts of violence and damage to 
property allegedly occurred which caused loss to various individuals and businesses.279 In 
preparation for the gathering, SATAWU took steps to meet the procedural requirements set out 
in the RGA. It gave notice of the gathering to the local authority and appointed about 500 
marshals to manage the crowd.280 It advised it members to desist from any unlawful and violent 
behaviour and requested the local authority to clear the roads of vehicles and erect barricades 
along the prescribed route on the day of the gathering. Regardless of these preventive measures 
being taken, the gathering allegedly resulted in riot damage estimated at 1, 5 million, many 
people were injured and about 39 others were arrested, shops were vandalised and looted, and 
vehicles were damaged.281 Eight of these businesses or individuals sought to hold SATAWU 
liable in terms of s11(1) of the RGA for the losses they have suffered and instituted proceedings 
against SATAWU in the High Court.  
SATAWU contested liability on merit and raised the argument that section 11(2)(b) was 
constitutionally invalid, particularly the words “and was not reasonably foreseeable” in that 
section.282  The legal issue before the High Court was whether section 11(2) unjustifiably limits 
the rights to assemble peacefully and unarmed. 283  SATAWU advanced two inter-related 
arguments in support of its argument that section 11(2) unjustifiably limits the right to assemble 
peacefully and unarmed. The High Court rejected the arguments and held that section 17 of the 
Constitution is not compromised by section 11(2)(b) because the right to freedom of assembly 
does not extend to gatherings which are not peaceful and section 11(2)(b) does not have a 
chilling effect on the exercise of the right. It was also held that, even if section 11(2)(b) does 
limit the right to freedom of assembly, this limitation must be balanced against the rights of 
individual members of the public to dignity, freedom from violence and arbitrary deprivation 
of property, all of which are affected by riot damage.284   The court concluded that the limitation 
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is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.285 
SATAWU appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal which dismissed the appeal on the ground 
that the statutory defence provided for in section 11(2) against a claim for riot damage is not 
illusory but real and capable of being proved.286 The SCA found that the scheme of the RGA, 
including section 11, is aimed at restricting unlawful, violent behaviour that violates the rights 
of others and ensuring that organisers of those gatherings are held liable.  
Furthermore, SATAWU then appealed to the Constitutional Court which also dismissed the 
arguments by SATAWU and the appeal failed. In coming to this conclusion, the CC considered 
two main arguments submitted on behalf of SATAWU. The first was based on the wording of 
section 11(2)(b) and (c). There are three requirements which must be proved for the defence of 
section 11(2) to succeed. The argument by SATAWU was that two of the requirements of the 
defence, when read together, infringed the constitutional principle of legality in that they were 
irrational.287 Hence, if an organiser of a gathering takes reasonable steps to guard against the 
act or omission occurring he would never be able to prove that these acts were not reasonably 
foreseeable.288 This was rejected by the court by saying the following:289 
 there is an inter-relationship between the steps that are taken by an organiser on the 
one hand and what is reasonably foreseeable on the other. The section requires that 
reasonable steps within the power of the organiser must be taken to prevent the act or 
omission that is reasonably foreseeable. The real link between the foreseeability and 
the steps taken is that the steps must prove to have been reasonable to prevent what was 
foreseeable. If the steps taken at the time of planning the gathering are indeed 
reasonable to prevent what was foreseeable, the taking of these preventive steps would 
render that the act or omission that subsequently caused riot damage reasonably 
unforeseeable. Both section 11(2)(b) and section 11(2)(c) would have been fulfilled. 
The court went on to point out that “it must be emphasised that organisations are required to 
be alive to the possibility of damage and to cater for it from the beginning of the planning of 
the protest action until the end of the protest action. At every stage in the process of planning, 
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and during the gathering, organisers must always be satisfied of two things: that an act or 
omission causing damage is not reasonably foreseeable and that reasonable steps are 
continuously taken to ensure that the act or omission that becomes reasonably foreseeable is 
prevented. This is the only way in which organisers can create a situation where acts or 
omissions causing damage remains unforeseeable. In such a case, the requirement of taking 
reasonable steps is not met simply by guarding against the occurrence of the damage-causing 
act or omission. The inquiry whether steps taken were sufficient to render the act or omission 
in question no longer reasonably foreseeable might be very exacting.”290   
The second contention was that section 11(2) infringed the Constitutional guarantee of freedom 
of assembly found in section 17 of the Constitution. The majority of the court concluded that 
the section did limit the rights found in section 17.291 Nevertheless, the majority went on to 
consider whether the limitation of this right is justifiable by virtue of the requirements sect out 
in section 36 of the Constitution. This section contemplates that a right may be limited if this 
is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom and considering a range of factors set out in that section.292 The court 
concluded that the limitation on the right to assemble is reasonable and justifiable.293 
Although it is clear that this judgement does not make it more difficult for a union to protect 
itself against claims arising from gatherings, it should be recalled that section 11 does not apply 
to ‘actions committed during the course of a picket that complies with the provisions of the 
LRA’.294 Hence, ordinary common law principles will apply.295  Therefore, it is clear that 
question whether a member of the public have a claim against a union was answered in the 
affirmative by the CC in the Garvas case. While trade unions have a choice whether to hold 
gatherings that may lead to rioting, those who are victims of riot damages do not have that 
choice. Thus, trade unions must consider the harm that materialize for others because of that 
riot.  
5.4 Conclusion 
The foundation of the employment relationship is trust and a duty to be honest (good faith). 
Employees are therefore not expected to engage in any misconduct that will breach the duty 
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that they owe to their employer. Hence, if they participate in violent strike the duty of good 
faith is directly impacted. 
 Moreover, in addition to section 23 of the Constitution and section 64(1) of the LRA which 
grants every worker with the right to strike, section 17 of the Constitution grants everyone the 
right to assemble, demonstrate, picket, and present petitions.296 Nonetheless, it limits these 
rights by stipulating that all these actions must take place peacefully and those taking part must 
be unarmed. 297  In terms of section 11(1) of the RGA, an organisation responsible for a 
gathering or demonstration which resulted in damage, shall be jointly and severally liable 
together with any other person who unlawfully caused or contributed to the damage. 298 
Statutory defence is provided for in section 11(2) of the RGA. As a result of the Garvas case, 
trade unions are expected and encouraged to take proper measures when convening a gathering 
to prevent violent conduct by the members which will result in liability of the union. SATAWU 
should have anticipated the aftermath damages effectuating riot and should have taken 
precautions to guard this from materialising. Furthermore, the RGA in Garvas allowed third 
parties to claim against a trade union for the fact that they should have reasonably foreseen that 
the strike will result from riot damage. This case is a lesson to trade unions who fail on their 
duties to control strikes which they convened.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The right to strike has been regarded as a foundational right in that it plays an important duty 
in collective bargaining. Hence, this right is a fruitful bargaining tool for employees. It is 
protected at international, regional and national level.299 In our South African law, the right to 
strike is protected in terms of section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution and section 64(1) of the LRA. 
Nonetheless, this is not absolute as it is limited in terms of section 36 of the Constitution which 
is a general limitation clause for all rights in the Bill of Rights.300 Not only section 36 of the 
Constitution limits the right to strike, it is also limited in terms of section 64 and 65 of the LRA. 
For a strike to be protected it must comply with the procedure set out in section 64 of the LRA 
and employees will not be held accountable for engaging in such a strike. For brevity, the LRA 
protect employees who are on strike if they followed the prerequisite set out in section 64. 
Therefore, employees are discouraged to engage in violent acts of misconduct and dismissal 
may follow. 
Non-compliance with the procedure that has been set out in section 64(1) of the LRA, will 
render a strike unprotected and engaging in such actions comprises misconduct. 301 
Furthermore, if employees engage in such actions, an employer may approach the LC for an 
interdict against the employees and may also claim compensation for the loss suffered. In 
Kapesi and others v Premier Foods Ltd t/a Blue Ribbon Salt River,302 an interdict was granted 
by the LC after several acts of violence and damage to property ensued during a strike. The 
violence continued despite the court granting an interdict. Employees are expected to respect a 
court order which is granted because if they do not respect it, they will be held in contempt of 
court. Employers may use any of the remedies (such as interdict, claim compensation, 
discouragement, disciplinary action and locking-out the employees) available if the strike 
continues to be violent. Hence, employees who commit violent acts of misconduct during an 
unprotected strike may be dismissed based on such conduct in terms of the provision of section 
188 of the LRA, and, items 4(1) and 7 of the Code of Good Practice.303    
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In Verulam Sawmills (Pty) Ltd v Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and 
others,304 Steenkamp J when considering violent conduct in the context of breach of picketing 
rules, said the following: 
“not only are picketing rules there to attempt to ensure the safety and security of persons 
and the employer’s workplace, but if they are not obeyed and violence ensued resulting 
in non-strikers also withholding their labour, the strike gain an illegitimate advantage 
in the power play of industrial action, placing illegitimate pressure on the employers to 
settle. Typically, one of two things then happen – either the employer gives in the to 
the pressure and settles at a rate above that reflecting the forces of demand and supply 
or the employer digs in its heels and refuses to negotiate or settle while the violence is 
ongoing (this normally prolongs the strike). Either way, the orderly system of collective 
bargaining that the LRA aspires to is undermined – and ultimately, economic activity 
and job security are threatened.” 
Moreover, trade unions are indispensable institutions in modern democratic society and their 
administrative skills are invaluable in the collective bargaining process, and they also provide 
an important counterbalance to the power of management during negotiations.305 They are 
entrusted with the duty to guard over the rights of their members. Failing on their duties in 
terms of their constitution and the provisions of the LRA can have undesirable result on their 
members. Furthermore, a lack of responsibility in the decisions and actions taken by trade 
unions may end in financial loss and joblessness for members.306 Trade unions are expected to 
encourage its members to comply with the court that had been issued by the courts against 
violent strikes. In the case of In2Food (Pty) Ltd,307 the LAC held that “the fact that a trade 
union can be liable for the acts of its members does not assist in deciding whether the trade 
union has breached a court order. The upshot is that when there is evidence to implicate the 
union vicariously in the unlawful acts of its members, there may well be an action available to 
the respondent for redress, but the liability of the appellant for contempt of a court order is 
strictly determined by reference to what the court ordered the trade union, itself, to do and the 
presentation of evidence that it did not do as it was told.”308 
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There is an obligation on trade unions to take all reasonable steps within their powers to 
persuade their members not to engage in unlawful action. It follows that where it is established 
that the members did engage in unlawful action, can it be said that the trade union did take all 
reasonable steps in its power to prevent it? This enquiry requires an investigation of what 
exactly the trade union did after the order of the court was granted and compare this with what 
it could reasonably have been expected to do. Hence, in simple terms the obligation 
contemplates continuous monitoring and intervention by the trade union. 309  In Verulam 
Sawmills,310 the court held that in the context of the pandemic of unprotected strike action and 
strike violence in South Africa, the courts are inclined to hold unions accountable for the 
unlawful conduct of their members and impose on them obligations to control their 
membership. This being a possible means of attempting to address the pandemic. 
The Labour Court does not expect the union to wash off its hands after it has convened a strike 
and that strike turned to be violent. Therefore, the court will hold the union liable. It can be 
disputed that the court may hold liable the union for failing on its duty to act on the interest of 
its members. Hence, this was confirmed in the case of FAWU v Ngcobo where it was held by 
the Constitutional Court that the union’s constitutional right to determine its administration did 
not mean that it could escape liability for responsibilities it had assumed and failed to honour.  
It is, therefore, submitted that there is duty on the trade unions to take reasonable steps to put 
an end to violence, damage to property, intimidation and any other act of misconduct that could 
be committed during a strike. Section 23 of the Constitution and section 64 of the LRA grants 
every worker with the right to strike, in addition to these sections, section 17 of the Constitution 
grants everyone the right to assemble, demonstrate, picket, and present petitions. What is 
important is that this section (section 17) limits these rights by stipulating that all these actions 
must take place peacefully and those participating must be unarmed. Section 11(1) of the RGA 
provides that an organisation responsible for a gathering or demonstration which has resulted 
in damage, shall be jointly and severally liable together with any other person who unlawfully 
caused or contributed to the damage. The Constitutional Court in Garvas311 case examined 
whether section 11(2)(b) of the RGA, which imposes on the union delictual liability for riot 
damages unless it can prove that the act or omission complained of did not fall within the 
objectives of the gathering and was not reasonably foreseeable, contravened the right of those 
                                                             
309 KPMM Road and Earthworks supra note 205. 
310 Verulam Sawmills supra note 304 at para 12. 
311  Garvas (note 247). 
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participating to demonstrate, picket, and present petitions in terms of section 17 of the 
Constitution. Hence, the court held that the objective of section 11 of the RGA served to protect 
members of the society, encompassing those who do not have the resources to identify and 
pursue the perpetrators of riot damage.312 Therefore, the union can be held liable for damages 
suffered by innocent individuals during a violent strike by its members. 
Moreover, due to the fact that there is a high number of violent strikes in South Africa, law 
enforcement authorities should consider developing areas of labour relations so that they 
provide how to deal with violent strikes. Since to the Labour Court is the accredited court to 
deal with labour matters, it must be given more power to deal with violent strikes. The LC must 
be strict when dealing with matters involving violent conduct and impose a harsh sanction so 
at to deter others (trade unions and their members) from engaging in violent conduct during a 
strike. The powers that should be given to the LC should include terminating industrial action. 
The courts trust trade unions to follow proper procedures and make sure that the strike does 
not escalate to violent, however, in most of the case it has been seen that these unions fail on 
their duties on stopping violence and sometimes they ‘wash their hands off’ of what has 
happened.   
Lastly, it is up to the trade unions to ensure that their members behave themselves properly 
during a strike, even if it is not protected.313 Trade unions should take all reasonably steps to 
make sure that the strike follows prescribed procedures, and can do this by even seeking help 
from the South African Police to assist in the prevention of damage during strikes.314 Hence, 
this will ensure that law and order is maintained, and violent conducts are not committed during 
a strike. Therefore, Lawlessness should not be allowed to invade and deprave the right to strike 
which employees should not abuse and misuse through acts of violence.315  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
312 Ibid.   
313 Manemela (note 15 above) 336. 
314 Gericke (note 24 above) 585. 
315 Manemela (note 15 above) 336. 
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